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Towards a Substantial EU-Japan Partnership
César DE PRADO*
The EU and Japan have spent decades normalizing trade links and attempting broader
cooperation. In July 2017, political leaders agreed in principle to an economic partnership
agreement (EPA) and to a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) hoping to enhance collaboration
on economic, political, security and other issues, all buttressed by fundamental values of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The agreements will likely be finalized and
ratified this decade, so a more substantial partnership between the EU and Japan may unroll in
economic and security fields as both sides adjust and converge their economic models and security
paradigms. Yet, a comprehensive partnership based on shared values would take much more time
to develop and galvanize the peoples of both sides.
1 AN EVOLVING, BUT STILL SHALLOW RELATIONSHIP
Official bilateral relations began in 1959 when Japan’s Prime Minister visited Brussels
and accredited Japan’s ambassador to Belgium also as Japan’s ambassador to the three
European Communities, which became an enhanced European Union (EU) in the
early nineties.1 Since then the relationship has developed in two distinct phases.2
The first phase, lasting from the 1960s until the 1980s, was dominated by
economic frictions while political relations emerged very slowly without any
common strategic vision.3 The 1960s saw the beginning of trade frictions while
Japan started political dialogues with the main Member States individually and
through its membership in the OECD. In the 1970s there was no European
Political Cooperation interested in Japan, although some contacts took place via
the Trilateral Commission, the US-led, high-level advisory network for the newly
created G-7 group of leaders of most industrialized countries.4 The 1980s
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4 S. Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge University Press 1990).
witnessed an incipient bilateral political dialogue, and in 1984 both sides held their
first ministerial meeting.
The second phase of EU-Japan relations may also span three decades, from the
1990s to the 2010s. It is characterized by a normalization of economic dialogues
while attempting to establish a more strategic framework for cooperation in trade
and security underpinned by converging values.
Since 1991, leaders from the EU and Japan usually hold annual summits. The
first one was held in The Hague (Netherlands) where they signed a joint strategic
declaration to enhance overall relations.5 Yet, links between the EU and Japan in
that decade remained weak due to a lack of understanding, trust, and interest.6
In their 10th summit, held in Brussels in 2001, both sides adopted a compre-
hensive EU-Japan action plan with many goals within four major objectives:
promoting peace and security; strengthening the economic and trade partnership
within globalization dynamics; coping with global and societal challenges; and
bringing together people and cultures.7 People-to-people exchanges in education,
science and technology did begin to develop. But once again, the concerned
officials, think-tank analysts and academics that have written on the evolution of
the EU-Japan bilateral relationship shared the view that despite much diplomatic
ceremony and recurrent dialogues, most strategic goals of the action plan were not
advancing substantially as they lacked focus and capabilities.8
In the 18th EU-Japan summit held in Prague in 2009 leaders expressed
interest in enhancing economic relations, as seen in paragraph 34 of the summit
declaration.9 Yet, in the 19th summit held in Tokyo in 2010, leaders set up a high-
level group with the task of identifying options for the comprehensive strengthen-
ing of all aspects of Japan-EU relations and defining the framework for implement-
ing it.10 In 2011, in the 20th summit held in Brussels, EU and Japanese leaders did
5 Joint Declaration on Relations Between The European Community and Its Member States and Japan, http://
eeas.europa.eu/japan/docs/joint_pol_decl_en.pdf, and www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/over
view/declar.html.
6 S. Nuttall, Europe and Japan, in Europe and the Asia-Pacific 175–176 (H. Maull, G. Segal & J. Wanandi
eds, Routledge 1998).
7 Shaping Our Common Future. An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation, http://ec.europa.eu/research/
iscp/pdf/policy/jp_action_plan_2001.pdf, and www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/
action0112.html.
8 M. Reiterer, Japan and the European Union: Shared Foreign Policy Interests, 4(3) Asia-Eur. J. 333–349
(2006); Tokyo-Brussels Partnership: Security, Development and Knowledge-Based Society (T. Ueta & É.
Remacle eds, Peter Lang 2008); J. Gilson, Drifting Apart? Japan-EU Relations, in Routledge Handbook of
Japanese Politics (A. Gaunder ed., Routledge 2011); J. Keck, D. Vanoverbeke & F. Waldenberger eds,
EU-Japan Relations, 1970–2012: From Confrontation to Global Partnership (Routledge 2013).
9 18th EU-Japan Summit (4 May 2009), Prague Joint Press Statement, http://eeas.europa.eu/japan/docs/
2009_summit_js_en.pdf; and www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/joint0905.html.
10 A. Berkofsky, EU-Japan Relations from 2001 to Today: Achievements, Failures and Prospects, 24(3) Jap. F.
275–279 (2012).
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not attempt to upgrade the detailed action plan of 2001, but decided to prepare the
stage to negotiate two interlinked agreements: a Strategic Partnership Agreement
(SPA) and an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).11
Progress in the first few years of negotiations was wanting. This was explained
by the status of the EU and Japan in international relations.12 Or by diplomatic
path dependency: ‘both sides find it hard to break away from earlier functional and
normative assumptions about their relative significance and about each other, in
order to forge a new meaningful, overarching partnership’.13 So, some experts
suggested just to focus on ‘interest-led, specific agenda building’,14 while others
believed that they could at least cooperate to help develop aspects of global
governance.15 Nevertheless, ‘the number of factors that promote the relationship
has increased whereas the factors preventing the relationship have decreased’.16
On 6 July 2017, at the 24th summit meeting in Brussels, and a day before
the G-20 summit in Hamburg in which Trump faced much global opposition to
his disruptive policies, the presidents of the European Council and the European
Commission and the Prime Minister of Japan reached a political agreement ‘in
principle’ to soon finalize both the SPA and EPA.17 They also aired globally an
optimistic statement highlighting their potential to enhance an array of eco-
nomic links, face new types of strategic challenges like climate change, and
‘recapture the shared values and common principles that form the foundation
of the EU-Japan partnership, including human rights, democracy and the rule
of law’.18
This article claims that the EU and Japan can substantiate eventual agreements
as there are relevant economic and security changes taking place within both the
EU and Japan. It first focuses on the evolution of the EU economy during the
nearly decade-long crisis, as well as the efforts behind Japan’s ongoing economic
reforms (Abenomics). Afterwards, it argues that both sides are wrapping the devel-
oping of their security and defence capabilities in new, global strategies. In a later
section it analyses the fundamental values repeatedly mentioned in EU-Japan
11 M. Söderberg, Introduction: Where is the EU–Japan Relationship Heading?, 24(3) Jap. F. 249 (2012).
12 A. Morii, Dialogue Without Cooperation? Diplomatic Implications of EU-Japan Summits, 13(4) Asia-Eur. J.
413–424 (2015).
13 J. Gilson, The Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the EU and Japan: the Pitfalls of Path Dependency?, 38
(7) J. Eur. Integration online 791–806 (2016).
14 Ibid., at 803.
15 The European Union and Japan: A New Chapter in Civilian Power Cooperation? (P. Bacon, H. Mayer & H.
Nakamura eds, Routledge-Ashgate 2015).
16 M. Tsuruoka, Japan’s Strategy Towards the EU: A Strategic Partnership in Search of Common Goals, in Asian
Countries’ Strategies Towards the European Union in an Inter-Regionalist Context 33 (H. Su ed., National
Taiwan University Press 2015).
17 European Commission, EU – Japan Summit: Leaders give Green Light to Landmark Economic and Strategic
Partnership Agreements (6 July 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1927_en.htm.
18 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/06-eu-japan-summit-statement/.
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political and diplomatic declarations, that is, democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law, but it argues that real convergence based on values would still take a long
time to mature. The article concludes with comments on the prospects of ratifica-
tion and further enhancement of the bilateral relationship.
2 TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
From humble steps, the EU and Japan have overcome many of their trade frictions
and promoted broader economic cooperation. In 1974, the European Commission
opened a delegation in Tokyo, and in 1979 set up an executive training pro-
gramme in Japan to train Europeans in Japanese language, culture and business. In
1987, the European Commission and Japan’s then Ministry of International Trade
and Industry jointly set up a cooperation centre. Several economic dialogues have
advanced since the 1990s, including on trade, de-regulation, industrial policy and
cooperation, employment and social issues, as well as and a high-level forum on
science and technology.
Yet, statistics did not show a glowing picture.19 Although the EU and Japan
are major economies in terms of GDP and trade, their links remain below potential
and stagnant. In the past few years, bilateral trade in goods was quite flat. As for still
incipient trade in services, flows from the EU to Japan were increasing, but flows
from Japan to the EU were declining slightly. Meanwhile, Japanese direct invest-
ment into the EU has long been much larger (it is the EU’s main global source)
than EU investment in Japan.
So the EU-Japan negotiations specially focused on enhancing economic links
via a Free Trade Area/Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA/EPA).20 The
European Commission launched in May 2011 a ‘Scoping Exercise for EU-Japan
FTA’ to have a detailed picture of the issues it wanted to negotiate with Japan.
Upon its completion in a year, in November 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council
(Trade) agreed to give the Commission the mandate to start the economic partner-
ship negotiations, as it promised to deliver very good economic results, and kept
some special safeguards.21 Macroeconomic studies indeed claimed greater eco-
nomic welfare in both countries if a deep FTA/EPA is achieved.22
19 European Commission Directorate General for Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/japan/.
20 The terminology of this agreement was not settled during the negotiations, because the EU tradition-
ally prefers FTA for its economic agreements with developed partners, while Japan prefers the term
EPA for its agreements and negotiations as they include many issues beyond trade.
21 Council of the European Union, Press Release, 3170th Council Meeting (Brussels 31 May 2012), www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130564.pdf.
22 D. Smeets, A Free Trade Agreement Between the EU and Japan – What is to be Expected?, 13(1) Asia–Eur.
J. 57–73 (2015).
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Progress in the trade negotiations was slow in the first few years to the point
that the EU considered downgrading a summit meeting.23 The EU eventually
released in May 2016 to the general public a comprehensive report on the status-
quo of the negotiations.24 In it one could see that the agenda was as broad as the
ones of other mega-FTAs.25 By then the EU and Japan were close to an agreement
on equivalence for sanitary and phytosanitary measures, but there was still limited
progress on general rules for trade in goods, on anti-dumping/anti-subsidies, cars,
agricultural products or alcoholic drinks, animal welfare, geographical indications
and other issues.
A breakthrough eventually happened in July 2017 with an agreement in
principle.26 The EU and Japan are nowadays aiming to raise from about 70%
to well over 90% of trade without tariffs. The EU would phase tariffs in cars,
while Japan would abolish tariffs on almost all industrial products and even in
some politically-sensitive food products, although cheese would still face
quotas. Geographical indicators would be protected. Some services, mainly
in transport and finance, would be partially liberalized. The EU would also
gain better access to Japan’s government procurement in medium-sized cities
and in railways. Although common rules of origin are quite detailed, the EPA
still needs to agree on many other non-tariff issues, like standards for many
primary, industrial and service sectors. Still, it is not expected to include new
procedures for settling disputes between investors and governments, nor
collaboration on data protection, key for the global cyber age, as Japan prefers
softer regimes than the EU does. Anyway, as the WTO Doha Round and the
Transatlantic and Trans-Pacific economic agreements are stalled, the EU-
Japan EPA would become the most significant economic liberalization agree-
ment of the decade.27
Substantiating the EPA and hoping to gradually enhance global trade and
investment is possible as the economies of both the EU and Japan keep evolving
and converging.
23 EU may Downgrade Summit with Japan as Trade Talks Stall, Jap. Times (5 Mar. 2016), www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2016/03/05/business/eu-may-downgrade-summit-with-japan-as-trade-talks-stall/.
24 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154554.pdf.
25 It covers 14 areas: (1) Trade in goods (including Market Access, General Rules and Trade Remedies);
(2) Non-Tariff Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade; (3) Rules of Origin; (4) Customs and Trade
Facilitation; (5) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; (6) Trade in Services; (7) Investment; (8)
Procurement; (9) Intellectual Property (including Geographical Indications); (10) Competition
Policy; (11) Other issues (General and Regulatory Cooperation, Business Environment, Animal
Welfare); (12) Trade and Sustainable Development; (13) Dispute Settlement; (14) General,
Institutional and Final Provisions and Transparency.
26 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf.
27 http://bilaterals.org/.
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3 CONVERGENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIES
Political and business elites have traditionally aimed for the EU to be a capitalist
market economy without tariffs nor many barriers to trade.28 The EU internal
market in goods has over several decades become quite liberalized, services
increasingly so since the 1990s, and competition among businesses assured by the
European Commission. There is still much work needed to accomplish a genuine
single market.29 For instance, regulation in already liberalized sectors can be
improved, bilateral investment treaties are still not merged, agriculture remains
expensive and very regulated, while energy, patents and public procurement, as
well as social safety nets, remain largely controlled by Member States with different
priorities.
On top of the single market, a monetary union, first tried in the 1970s,
began emerging in the 1990s. The Eurozone now has nineteen Member States
while several other countries gravitate to the actions of the European Central
Bank (ECB) system. However, its faults became visible as it was hit by a financial
crisis sparked in the US. Since 2007, Europe has generally experienced economic
recessions and stagnation affecting peoples, firms and governments. At first, the
EU and was caught in between ‘better’ and ‘more’ approaches to move
forward.30
A middle way forward is what actually has taken place. There have been
various bailouts from Northern to Southern Europe conditioned on important
domestic reforms, several monetary stimuli mainly from the ECB partly inspired by
Japan,31 stronger banking regulations, and other measures that put the EU on a still
slow growth track.32 Meanwhile, the European Commission President Juncker
launched in 2014 a large and growing investment fund leveraging private
resources. Critics pointed out that ‘many of the underlying conditions that pro-
duced the Eurozone crisis remain unaddressed’.33 Greece’s economy is still very
weak, Italian banks risk default, public deficits and accumulated debts remain high,
and there is still no fiscal union in sight. Yet, in mid-2017, the mood for a EU-led
28 J.-C. Defraigne & P. Nouveau, Introduction à l’Economie Européenne, 2e ed. (Deboeck, 2017).
29 J. Pelkmans, What Strategy for a Genuine Single Market?, Special Report No 126 (Centre for European
Policy Studies 2016), www.ceps.eu/publications/what-strategy-genuine-single-market.
30 Jean-Claude Trichet et al., A Report to the Trilateral Commission by the 2012/2014 European Group Task
Force on Credible European Governance (Washington, DC, Brussels and Tokyo 2014), www.trilateral.
org/download/doc/EU%20TF_on_Governance_FINAL_MAY_2014.pdf.
31 N. Roubini, Abenomics, European-Style (31 Aug. 2014), www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
nouriel-roubini-supports-ecb-president-mario-draghi-s-plan-to-revive-eurozone-growth.
32 Eurostat Economic Indicators, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/economy/desktop/index.
html; The Economist, Economic and Financial Indicators, www.economist.com/node/21604509.
33 B. Eichengreen, Europe’s Poisoned Chalice of Growth (15 Apr. 2015), www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/europe-growth-reform-by-barry-eichengreen-2015-04?barrier=true.
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economic recovery was optimistic,34 although there are still some challenges to
overcome.35
Abenomics (the popular term for Abe’s government economic strategy) is a
complex set of reforms aiming to revitalize Japan within three macroeconomic
pillars or ‘arrows’.36 In June 2013 the government announced its preliminary goals,
in June 2014 released a much more comprehensive strategy with over 240 detailed
proposals, in June 2015 revised goals were to pay more emphasis to productivity,
and in mid-2016 announced further stimuli requiring new public debt. Abenomics’
first arrow is aggressive monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, which has success-
fully averted the deflation of the economy. The second arrow is a new fiscal policy
that benefits producers while increasing the consumption tax, but reaching fiscal
consolidation still seems very elusive. The third arrow is the most comprehensive
and difficult to achieve as it aims to promote a more liberal regulatory environ-
ment, focusing on corporate governance, on markets like agriculture and health
with very powerful vested interests, on promoting productive human capital and
innovation, and on creating special economic zones. Tokyo’s hosting of the
summer Olympic Games in 2020 and other large-scale entertainment events may
be considered a special arrow expected to bring both economic benefits and lift
national spirits.
Economic progress in Japan is real although its speed is debated. The Japanese
government led by Shinzo Abe remains publicly optimistic of Abenomics, high-
lighting, for instance, growth in jobs or tourist revenues. Nevertheless, critics
highlight the lack of focus on raising consumer demand and structural rigidities,
like barriers for women and foreigners.37
5 TOWARDS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
Yearly EU-Japan summits produced long statements listing not only bilateral, but
also regional and global issues in which they would like to increase cooperation. In
that vein, the July 2017 agreement in principle for a SPA is an attempt to explore
34 D. M. Herszenhorn & J. Barigazzi, Mario Draghi’s Secret Formula to Explain EU’s Good Mood (23 June
2017), www.politico.eu/article/europe-economy-mario-draghis-secret-formula-to-explain-eus-
good-mood-e↑♥/.
35 S. Johnson, A European Economic Miracle? (30 June 2017), www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
eurozone-sustainable-economic-recovery-by-simon-johnson-2017-06.
36 www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html; www.cfr.org/japan/abenomics-japanese-economy/p30383.
37 T. Hoshi, Abenomics: Where are We now?, Presentation at the US – Japan Forum: Uncertain Prospects
and Policy Challenges for the Global Economy (Washington, DC 25 Sept. 2015), www.jef.or.jp; Three-
Piece Dream Suit, Economist (20 July 2016), www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21702756-abenomics-may-have-failed-live-up-hype-it-has-not-failed-and; S. Shibata, Re-Packaging
Old Policies? ‘Abenomics’ and the Lack of an Alternative Growth Model for Japan’s Political Economy, 29(3)
Jap. F. 399–422 (17 Feb. 2017).
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variegated common interests ranging from climate change to migration manage-
ment, from basic research to security.38
The climate of insecurity near both the EU and Japan will probably entice
both sides to first enhance soft forms of security cooperation hoping to reduce
tensions in Ukraine, Crimea, Syria, Israel-Palestine, Iran, the Korean peninsula, or
the South China Sea. Nuclear proliferation in North Korea is particularly high-
lighted as further escalation may turn into a global conflict.39 Hard, military
cooperation may also happen in the medium term. But moving beyond dialogue
into substantial collaboration in other, seemingly less pressing issues, will probably
take even more time as both sides slowly enlarge their global strategic visions.
The contested terminology of the SPA during negotiations reflected the
uncertain eventual scope and resources to be allocated to the many issues being
discussed. Not all EU Member States use the term ‘strategic’ when referring to the
SPA negotiations. Moreover, although the EU and Japan claimed in summit
statements during most of the 2000s to be strategic partners, that terminology
did not appear in the statements of 2010 and 2011. In the EU, negotiators some-
times used the term Framework Agreement which they reserve for a variety of
political agreements with economic components.
5.1 CRAFTING GLOBAL STRATEGIES
Europeanism and Transatlanticism have long been the two main strategic thinking
approaches in Europe, while neutralism and superpower visions remain
secondary.40 This assessment is being rebalanced, albeit very slowly, as the EU
advances more comprehensive strategies.41 The EU Defence Council meeting of
December 2013, the first one in several years, invited the High Representative to
upgrade the 2003 European Security Strategy. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) on
Foreign and Security policy was presented by the High Representative to the
European Council in June 2016.42 It reiterates general principles of security,
democracy, and sustainable, open and fair prosperity, and highlights that the
EU’s priorities should be an integrated approach to conflicts.
38 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/07/06/.
39 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/06-eu-japan-dprk/.
40 P. Venesson, Competing Visions for the European Union Grand Strategy, 15(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.
57–75 (2010).
41 A. Missiroli, Strategic Foresight – and the EU (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2013),
www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-foresight-and-eu.
42 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy
for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (Brussels, 2016), http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/;
www.iai.it/en/persone/nathalie-tocci.
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Geographically, the EUGS focuses on Europe’s neighbourhood. Yet, to deal
with the current global disorder, the EU would promote a global multi-level
governance approach,43 as it wishes to cooperate with states and non-state actors,
regional orders (especially NATO but also those developing in Asia), and interna-
tional organizations (with the UN at the core), for security, economic and social
goals. Furthermore, Asia would become a key factor for Europe’s future as the US
rebalances its priorities towards a region facing several challenges, mainly a rising
China: indeed, almost at the same time of releasing the EUGS, EU institutions
presented details to enhance a EU strategy towards China.44 Stressing EU values, it
highlighted issues like law, human rights and the environment.
From the 1950s until the 1980s, under a conservative political system, the
reign of Emperor Hirohito (Showa era), and as junior partner to the United States
in the Cold War, Japan rapidly grew demographically and became the second
largest economy in the world. Since the 1990s, with a political system in turbu-
lence, the reign of Emperor Akihito (Heisei era), and the post-Cold War fluid
system in which China and other powers and actors grow, Japan stagnated
demographically and economically. However, since 2013 Japan is undertaking
political and economic changes hoping to regain its former strength as the
Shinzo Abe government is advancing a set of comprehensive reforms mixing
economic (Abenomics), social and security goals.45
Japan’s external strategy has since the 1950s been to try to thrive by linking to
growth drivers while maintaining a strong security alliance with the United States.
Some argued that ‘[b]y trying to pursue a policy that is simultaneously UN-
centred, Asia-oriented, autonomous, and consistent with the goals of the bilateral
alliance with the United States, Japan’s foreign policy ends up confused and
ineffective’.46 In particular, the US-Japan arrangement was at risk of drifting as
power evolved globally.47
So it was time for Japan to carefully design a grander and more coherent
strategy.48 Eventually, the same academic advanced a framework to develop
43 C. de Prado, Global Multi-Level Governance: European and East Asian Leadership (United Nations
University Press 2007).
44 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Joint Communication: Elements for a New EU Strategy on China (22 June 2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-
_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf.
45 S. Abe, The Second Opening of Japan (21 Apr. 2014), www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shinzo-
abe-uses-barack-obama-s-visit-as-an-opportunity-to-lay-out-his-country-s-grand-strategy.
46 R. Samuels, Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy, 29(4) Washington Q. 111–127 (2006).
47 R. Armitage & J. Nye, The US-Japan Alliance; Anchoring Stability in Asia (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies 2012), http://csis.org/publication/us-japan-alliance-1.
48 T. Inoguchi, Japan Desperately Needs Grand Strategy, PacNet 23 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum
CSIS 25 Mar. 2009), www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-23-japan-desperately-needs-grand-strategy.
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greater internal and external capacities, balancing security concerns with more
political institutions and economic development.49 And so, a broad view of
security is particularly being enhanced as in 2013 the government of Shinzo
Abe issued Japan’s first National Security Strategy. In line with Japan’s char-
acter, it is somewhat ambiguous as it tries not to displease anyone, although its
‘proactive pacifism’ keeps the door open for enhanced capabilities and foreign
operation within any type of coalition under international law.50 It particularly
enhances its alliance with the United States, but it also details a broad interest
in collaborating with the large array of Europe’s soft power assets, including
the EU.
5.2 ENHANCING SECURITY CAPABILITIES
Largely under the umbrella of the United States, and despite their trade frictions,
EU and Japanese officials and experts have pursued since the 1970s many dialogues
on security, sometimes leading to practical cooperation mainly in soft, non-military
matters.51 First discussions centred in environmental risks, which over time facili-
tated cooperation ranging from forests to climate change. Efforts since the 1980s to
jointly provide development aid have broader potential as both the EU and Japan
are the world’s largest donors and those sources could be used to enhance mutual
(human) security capabilities.52 Humanitarian cooperation has also improved since
2011.53
Nowadays, dialogues also explore issues like terrorism, cyber-security,
science and technology, energy, disarmament and non-proliferation.54 Military
security cooperation between the EU and Japan has not yet been substantial.55
49 T. Inoguchi, A Call for a New Japanese Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas of a Stakeholder State, 90(4) Int’l Aff.
943–958 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12149/abstract.
50 Government of Japan, National Security Strategy 1 (Tokyo 2014), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/
documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/18/NSS.pdf; S. Kitaoka, Japan’s New National Security
Strategy in the Making, Speech at the East West Centre (Honolulu, Hawaii 23 Sept. 2013), http://
vimeo.com/77183187.
51 O. Mykal, The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Invisible but Comprehensive (Amsterdam University Press
2011).
52 A Proposal for a Way Forward on EU-Japan Cooperation at the Nexus of Security and Development, Results of
the KAS-EJARN Project at the Nexus of Security and Development in 2011/2012, www.kas.de/wf/
doc/kas_33560-1522-1-30.pdf?130313094925; A. Fukushima, Japan-Europe Cooperation for Peace and
Stability: Pursuing Synergies on a Comprehensive Approach (Tokyo Foundation 2015), www.tokyofounda
tion.org/en/articles/2015/japan-europe-cooperation.
53 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/eu-japan-cooperation-disaster-management-and-humanitarian-aid_en.
54 T. Renard, Partnering for Global Security: The EU, Its Strategic Partners and Transnational Security
Challenges, 21(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 9–34 (2016).
55 P. Midford, By Land and by Sea: The Potential of EU-Japan Security Cooperation, 24(3) Jap. F. 289–316
(2012).
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Crisis management was at first pursued through other organizations: in the late
1990s, Japan helped pacify the Western Balkans via the OSCE while Japan
helped the EU join the Korea Energy Development Organization, which tried
to prevent nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. In the following decade the
EU and Japan failed to link efforts to achieve peace in Aceh after the Indian
Ocean Tsunami, or to train police in Afghanistan. Only in 2014 Japan success-
fully joined the EU in a multinational counter-piracy naval operation in the
Gulf of Aden.56 Yet, the two parties are in 2017 working on a framework for
Japan’s voluntary participation in EU’s military missions.57 An overview of
developments in both the EU and in Japan suggests that in a few years that
type of cooperation may take place.
Since the end of the Cold War the EU has gradually enhanced its internal
and external security capabilities to become a secondary but relevant actor
within the ecosystem of security arrangements centred in Europe.58 The
Treaty of Lisbon set up a European External Action Service headed by a
permanent High Representative and increased the range of civilian and mili-
tary missions that willing Member State forces may engage in. Those missions
signified a minor contribution to European and world peace but, at least, they
tested coordination of policies, institutions, people, and equipment.59
Since the year 2016 the EU and most of its Member States noticeably
began enhancing security cooperation. The EU no only released that year its
Global Strategy presented above, it has added new plans and began increasing
defence spending after years of decline. The overall defence budget of Member
States grew remarkably in 2016 (up by 8.3%)60 and, preparing for a larger EU
defence fund, the 2017 funding for the European Defence Agency began to
grow modestly (1.6%).61 Substantial EU-NATO cooperation finally became a
56 A. Missiroli ed., The EU and the World: Players and Policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 166–167
(European Union Institute of Security Studies 2016), www.iss.europa.eu/content/handbook-%E2%
80%93-eu-and-world-players-and-policies-post-lisbon.
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handle/1814/27498/RSCAS_2013_44.pdf?sequence=1.
60 T. Kington, Russian Aggression Drives Increase in European Defense Spending, Defense News (18 Feb.
2016), www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2016/02/18/russian-aggression-
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Developments, Trends and Drivers (A. Marrone, O. De France & D. Fattibene eds, Istituto Affari
Internazionali et al. 2016) www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pma_report.pdf.
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reality just before the European Council meeting in December 2016.62 In May
2017, Merkel pressed for greater European cooperation (suggesting that the
indispensable US and the UK may not be reliable),63 and the quick activation
of flexible cooperation in the field of defence via Permanent Structured
Cooperation was called by the European Council in June.64
Meantime, Japan relentlessly expands its security roles and capabilities
under the US oversight.65 During the Cold War Japan’s sizeable self-defence
forces hardly ever ventured abroad, but since the nineties thousands of military
and police officers have provided relief in disaster areas, participated in peace-
keeping operations, helped the US global war on terror, and financially sup-
ported several operations. In the current decade, Abe’s government set up a
National Security Council to centralize analysis and advice, increased the
defence budget, established an equipment procurement agency that can globally
exchange technology and equipment, agreed with the US on new guidelines to
enhance their bilateral alliance to be ready to act in the region and beyond,
legally protected state secrecy and, despite large public protests and expert
criticisms, enacted a package of legislation to reinterpret Article 9 of Japan’s
Constitution to allow its forces to carefully participate in some collective, self-
defence missions.
6 ON FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
In an attempt to become all encompassing, Summit declarations between the EU
and Japan highlight democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Echoing it, Japan’s
ambassador to the EU proclaimed in this journal in 2016: ‘Above all, the coopera-
tion is firmly based on our unwavering shared commitment to fundamental values,
namely democracy, human rights and the rule of law.’66 Yet, for the 2017 summit
declaration, Japan seemed reluctant to include issues beyond trade and security:
62 European External Action Service, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/
16643/eu-and-nato-start-new-era-of-cooperation_en; S. Biscop & J. Lindley-French, What are the





65 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016 39–54 (2016),
www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20dossiers/issues/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-
2016-2288/rsa16-05-chapter-3-5122; G. Delamotte, Japan’s Decisive Defence Development (9 May
2016), www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_japans_decisive_defence_development_7021; Japan Ministry
of Defence Annual White Papers, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html; Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Security Policy, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/.
66 K. Katakami, Guest Editorial – The Japan-EU Relationship: A True Strategic Partner Based on Mutual Trust,
21(2) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 159–163 (2016).
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Tokyo signalled it preferred a statement solely on the trade deal. Japanese officials also
weren’t best pleased about the fact that Brussels linked the trade deal to assurances on
democracy or human rights – as if the Japanese government had deficits in these areas. A
possible compromise could be to draft a downscaled text confined to endorsing the
political agreement of the trade deal and a collaboration against terrorism, one diplomat
suggested.67
That may be because the nature of fundamental values still differs in the EU and
Japan:
A normative partnership between Japan and the EU is still premature, and needs the
accumulation of further practical cooperation. On several issues, such as the abolition of
the death penalty, Japan and the EU think differently, and their interpretations of human
rights are not the same. So it might be possible to argue that Japan’s normative turn is just a
rhetorical one.68
Are fundamental values between EU and Japan very similar, as officials propa-
gate, or different enough to preclude more actors and issues beyond trade and
security to substantiate their relationship? Let’s first look at the EU and Japan
generally, and then focus on democracy, human rights and the rule of law
separately.
The EU was built on liberal and solidarity principles in an unprecedented
effort, largely aided by the US, to bury its conflictual past. European countries that
wanted to join the Community had to accept the civil liberties underpinning the
single market. Since the 1990s candidates to the EU have to fulfil the ‘Copenhagen
criteria’ of democracy, rule of law, human rights, functioning market economy,
respect and protection of minorities, and acceptance of the obligations and intent
of the EU.69 Since the Treaty of Lisbon, fundamental values further underpin the
EU and its relations with the rest of the world. Well, in fact, not all EU members
fully respect them and nowadays there is a debate about sanctioning some
countries.70
Furthermore, in external relations, conditions vary according to the many
types of possible associations and partnerships (ten, including the one with Japan,
are supposed to be particularly strategic), but the EU has long been considered a
normative power in the global scene.71 The values of the EU remain Western
67 H. von der Burchard & J. Hanke, EU and Japan Hit Back at Protectionism with Trade Deal (12 July 2017),
www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-japan-negotiators-seal-trade-agreement/.
68 Y. Hosoya, The Evolution of the EU-Japan Relationship: Towards a ‘Normative Partnership’?, 24(3) Jap. F.
332 (2012).
69 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm.
70 G. Friedman, Hungary, Poland and Illiberal Democracy, Euractiv (22 Mar. 2016), www.euractiv.com/
section/global-europe/opinion/hungary-poland-and-illiberal-democracy/.
71 I. Manners, Does the EU Act as a Normative Power? The European Union’s Normative Power in Global
Politics, in Key Controversies in European Integration 192–198 (H. Zimmermann & A. Dür eds, Palgrave
Macmillan 2012).
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despite different interests, priorities, and reluctance to share the costs of defending
them.72
Japan traditionally preferred group order over individual human rights, con-
sultations to induce consensus over democratic decision, and mediation behind
closed doors over the rule of law in public courts.73 Modern Japan’s values have
evolved substantially, and despite bouts of nationalism they seem to be quiet
strong. For instance, Japan’s protracted debates about revising its constitution are
reaching a crescendo on many issues beyond Article 974; early drafts seemed to
move to illiberalism, but recent drafts suggest maintaining if not enhancing
safeguards.75
Similarly, the external promotion of Japan’s values has been questioned. The
term ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, which symbolized a new direction of
Japanese diplomacy and reinforced cooperation with countries sharing such ideals
as democracy, freedom, and human rights ceased for a while being a priority in
current Japanese diplomatic strategy.76 But we will now see in detail that Japan
seems generally committed to those values although advances them pragmatically.
6.1 DEMOCRACY
Both the EU Member States and the EU institutions are striving to enhance
competitive electoral democracy. The prospects of membership into the EU
successfully induced democratic reforms first in Southern Europe and later in
Eastern Europe. EU institutions, traditionally elite driven, are trying to reach to
all concerned stakeholders. The functional European Commission has lost some
power to the intergovernmental European Council, and to the European
Parliament. European elections and Europarties remain secondary for the electo-
rate, but after the Brexit referendum centre-right parties in favour of the EU are
winning over populist and extremist parties that promised to devolve power to
Member States. In particular, France seems to be back in a position to reactivate its
relationship with Germany to co-drive the strengthening of the EU.77
72 W. Wallace, Are Values Diverging Across the Atlantic?, 21(3) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 355–364 (2016).
73 Japan: A Country Study (R. Dolan & R. Worden eds, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress
1994), http://countrystudies.us/japan/.
74 J. W. Hornung, Constitutional Revision in Japan: Why Change is Hard to Come By, Foreign Aff. (26 July
2016), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-07-26/constitutional-revision-japan.
75 Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Constitutional Revision Research Project,
http://rijs.fas.harvard.edu/crrp/.
76 Y. Hosoya, The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ and the Future
Asian Order, 18(1) Asia-Pac. Rev. 13–24 (2011).
77 M. Leonard, Can ‘Mercron’ Deliver for Europe? (3 July 2017), www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
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Post-War Japan’s political culture tried to reach consensus among competing
gate-keepers which left little room for political leadership.78 Prime Ministers
usually stayed in office for very short periods, often resorting to populist state-
ments, while officials commanded greater influence in the political process, espe-
cially in foreign affairs. Yet, the Japanese electorate is becoming more concerned
about politics and voting in favour of liberal reforms. The Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) has been in power for most of the post-war period, and although the
electorate gave the helm to the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, in
2012 it put the LDP firmly back in power in coalition with Komeito, a Buddhist
centrist party.79 Shinzo Abe, scion of a family of pro-US politicians, has become a
more European-type politician able to lead the LDP and advance reforms, as he has
remained in power winning election after election for several years, and having
balanced the power of technocrats with hand-picked politicians aids.80 At any rate,
as an indication of what may happen in national elections, in July 2017, Tomin
First no Kai (Tokyoites first group), a new regional party led by Tokyo Governor
Yuriko Koike, and supported by Komeito won a large majority of seats in the
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly while the LDP dropped substantially.81 Two
months later, she formed a Party of Hope to contest in a snap national election
in October. Although hawkish in foreign policy, Ms. Koike generally supports
economic liberalism, administrative transparency and efficiency, women joining
the labour force and other policies in a similar way to many European more or less
centrist parties.82
Globally, Japan seems to prefer to democratic partners:
A quiet revolution is transforming Japanese diplomacy. This revolution predates the
current administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and spans multiple governments in
Tokyo, including those run by the now-opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). For
more than a decade, Tokyo has worked to diversify its democratic partnerships beyond the
continuing anchor of the U.S.-Japan alliance by forging closer relations with like-minded
powers in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In pursuing a grand strategy of connectivity
78 J. Gannon & R. Sahashi, Japan’s Way Forward: The Prospects for Political Leadership and the International
Implications, in Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan 181–196 (R. Sahashi &
J. Gannon eds, Japan Centre for International Exchange 2015), www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/
PolLeadership/8_gannon.pdf.
79 R. Fahey, Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg? The Anti-Conspiracy Bill and the Future of the LDP-
Komeito Coalition, Japan Forward (27 Jan. 2017), https://japan-forward.com/killing-the-goose-that-
laid-the-golden-egg/.
80 G. Pugliese, Kantei Diplomacy? Japan’s Hybrid Leadership in Foreign and Security Policy, 30(2) Pac. Rev.
152–168 (2017).
81 P. Jain, Tokyo Governor Koike Unsettles Prime Minister Abe’s Party, East Asia F. (16 July 2017), www.
eastasiaforum.org/2017/07/16/tokyo-governor-koike-unsettles-prime-minister-abes-party/; A. Mulgan.
Where Is Japan’s Party System Headed?, East Asia F. (10 Oct. 2017), www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/10/
where-is-japans-party-system-headed/.
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among democracies, Japan has leveraged different foreign policy instruments, from foreign
aid to strategic infrastructure development to defence supply. Japan’s ultimate success in
this endeavor could determine whether the United States will maintain its leadership in an
Asia-Pacific region buffeted by dynamic power shifts.83
6.2 HUMAN RIGHTS
EU Member States have all signed the International Bill of Human Rights centred
in the UN, and the European Convention on Human Rights and other conven-
tions centred in the Council of Europe. The EU tries to go further as its Charter of
Fundamental Rights, with legal effect by the Treaty of Lisbon, requires upholding
(with few opt-outs) many political, social, economic and legal rights for citizens.84
Yet, some behaviour of various EU Member States raise concern, and even the
UK and Nordic countries draw some criticism.85 In particular, the EU nowadays
struggles to find arrangements to address the influx of refugees from its troubled
neighbourhood as several Member States suffer increasing bouts of racism and
xenophobia, give excessive leeway to the police, engage in mass surveillance with
few controls, and even close borders.
Meantime, Japan has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but
not all the covenants of the International Bill, and it also draws mild international
criticism.86 Nonetheless, Japan cooperates with the Council of Europe and is
slowly adapting to the EU’s position on human rights. For instance, although it
only grants refugee status to a very small number of asylum-seekers, Japan provides
funds to UN organizations dealing with displaced people,87 and is beginning to
accept that it needs more immigrants.88 Even strong critics acknowledge that the
Japanese government is serious about improving its human rights record, and point
out that Japanese of mixed ethnicity are winning beauty contests and Olympic
83 D. M. Kliman & D. Twining, Japan’s Democracy Diplomacy (The German Marshall Fund of the United
States 2014), www.spf.org/media/upload/3_GMF_final.pdf.
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port/; Amnesty International, State of the World 2016/2017, (London 2017), www.amnestyusa.org/
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86 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jinken.html (in Japanese); US
Department of State, 2015 Human Rights Reports: Japan (2016), www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2015/eap/252767.htm; Amnesty International, ibid., at 208–210; Asia-Pacific Human Rights
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medals, and women even becoming disruptive political leaders.89 Greater social
convergence may come with the passing of the Heisei era. In July 2016 Emperor
Akihito announced his will to abdicate ‘within a few years’, and a month later
broadcasted his underlying thoughts.90 An expert panel then considered various
options and consequences for an unprecedented abdication law, as having a female
heir would help transform Japan’s social structure dominated by male elders.91
The EU occasionally induces Japan to continue enhancing its human rights
record, wishing it reformed its criminal laws to harness the powers of the police, to
secure better treatment in Japanese prisons or, in particular, to abolish the death
penalty.92 In 2014, partly due to EU pressure, Japan signed the convention on
parental child abduction.93
6.3 RULE OF LAW
The rule of law is another solid value of the EU. Its space of liberty, security and
justice was communitarized by the Treaty of Lisbon.94 The European Court of
Justice and other mechanisms promote it among Member States although more
could be done.95 Its enforcement has been enhanced as Europol (Police) and
Frontex (Border and Coast) have become EU agencies with increasing mandates
and resources.
In Japanese legal culture the concept of protecting individual rights in courts is
too novel to be as rooted as in the EU. During the Showa era law was a secondary
means of achieving social order: intra group discipline and conciliation were more
used than litigation. Yet, during the Heisei era Japan began reforming its justice
system, eventually increasing the number of lawyers and judges, and even promot-
ing citizen juries.96
In that vein, the EU supported Japan’s accession to the International Criminal
Court in 2007, and both partners had agreed on mutual legal assistance in criminal
89 D. Arudou, Japan’s Human Rights Issues Fared Better in 2016, Jap. Times (9 Jan. 2017), www.debito.
org.
90 www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detailEn/12.
91 J. Perry & Y. Wakatsuki, Japan Passes Historic Law to Allow Beloved Emperor to Abdicate, CNN (9 June
2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/08/asia/abdication-law-japan-passes/index.html.






95 C. Closa, The EU Needs a Better and Fairer Scrutiny Procedure Over Rule of Law Compliance, Policy Brief
(European University Institute 2015), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/35995.
96 D. Vanoverbeke, Juries in the Japanese Legal System: The Continuing Struggle for Citizen Participation and
Democracy (Routledge 2015).
TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIAL EU-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP 451
matters since 2010. Globally, both sides also promote international law, as seen, for
instance, in this declaration: ‘Above all, it is an important role of ASEM to ensure
that Asia and Europe work together to maintain liberal and open international
order by thoroughly upholding the principle of the “rule of law”.’97
7 PROSPECTS OF RATIFICATION AND SUBSTANTIATION
From the sixties till the eighties, relations between the EU and Japan were
characterized by trade frictions. During the next three decades both sides have
been striving to set appropriate frameworks for more substantive relations.
Optimistically put, nowadays both sides hope to finalize agreements for eco-
nomic and strategic partnerships not only to lower tariffs and many other
barriers to trade and investment, but also to broaden security cooperation,
and even to address many social and environmental concerns, all underpinned
by some convergence of fundamental values of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law.
Ratification of the final agreements may prove difficult as vested interested
keep fighting for privileges and people in general start to look into it and wonder
what’s in for them. The EPA should pass both houses of the Japanese parliament, as
well as the parliaments of each EU Member State and, perhaps, of some sub-state
parliaments. With luck, all that could happen in a year or two so the EPA could
start taking effect in 2019 or 2020, when the next EU institutional leadership
should be in place, Brexit clearly addressed, and a post-Heisei era crowned by
Olympic events.
According to a sustainability report the ‘potential economic gains, outlined in
the overall economic analysis, will not be outweighed by negative social and
environmental impacts’.98 And the agreement in principle highlighted novel issues
like corporate governance. Yet, the non-governmental organization Greenpeace
published online in early 2017 leaks of chapters of the negotiations to raise
concerns about environmental and governance clauses.99 This type of contestation
may further the already strong opposition to liberalizing economies via large
international trade agreements. Even in Germany, the EU’s largest trader, 70%
of its citizens do not favour change as the country has been recently doing well in
the EU context, and fear of, inter alia, increasing inequality harming workers
97 F. Kishida, Japan’s Initiative for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia-Eur. Found. Newsl. (21 June
2016), http://asef.org/press/corporate/news-3871-japans-initiative-for-the-asia-europe-meeting-
asem-.
98 European Commission DG Trade, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the FTA Between the EU and
Japan, LSE Enterprise (2016), www.tsia-eujapantrade.com.
99 https://trade-leaks.org/jefta-leaks/.
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and consumers.100 Similarly, many people in Japan have protested against freer
trade, so the country elites are quietly focusing to galvanize economic allies to only
partially refloat the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement after the Donald Trump
decided not to ratify it.101
At any rate, when looking at the structural evolution of the economies of the
EU and Japan, the prospects of further substantiating economic links seem real.
Their primary sectors are still very protected but small, so they need new sources of
growth in industry and, especially, services. Moreover, continental Member States
of the EU promote their coordinated varieties capitalism which are closer to
Japan’s than the very liberal Anglo-Saxon types that create great inequalities.102
Thus, there may soon be increasing opportunities for managed trade and invest-
ment via large businesses that link to practitioners and propose measures to
facilitate economic links, like the EU-Japan Business Round Table (BRT)103
comprising about fifty leading companies that exchange views and present yearly
to authorities sets of joint recommendations to enhance macroeconomic relations
as well as sectoral ones, often in high-technology and service sectors.
Meanwhile, the tensions near the EU and Japan are also inducing both sides to
upgrade and link their security capabilities.104 Ad-hoc human security in search for
better global multi-level governance would continue to be the easiest route, but
there may be minor opportunities to co-work on military policies, arms, missions,
gradually building confidence among elites, and broadening the security culture to
win the hearts and minds of more actors, all underpinned by the common values
presented in their summit statements.105 In the meantime, difficult military
100 M. Fratzscher, Germany’s Strange Turn Against Trade, Project Syndicate (6 June 2016), www.project-
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2016-06.
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operations in places like Syria or the Korean peninsula would still largely depend
on the US leading NATO and other groupings enticing other great powers, that if
under Trump eventually become disrupted, would only speed up the convergence
of EU’s security with its strategic partners around the world.
Even if an EPA lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers and a SPA enhancing
security links take effect this decade, the EU and Japan would still need to go
beyond the rhetoric of shared values to galvanize resources that strengthen more
types of links. Only a few services partially deregulated since the nineties are
mentioned in the EPA, and the SPA gives little consideration to collaborating in
the many service sectors under governmental control. For a grander, more com-
prehensive partnership, the growing number of experts and people able to place
EU-Japan economic and security links in global perspective should also consider
the value of enhancing education at all levels, traditional and new media, sports
beyond Olympics, inspiring arts and other ways to enhance relations among a
broader array of peoples.
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